#1 Bitcoin Fee Estimator and Calculator (2020 Updated)

Stephen (BitPay CEO):"a typical #bitcoin transaction costs $1.80 now, >200k unconfirmed transactions, time for a hard fork to larger blocks ... 8mb please"

Stephen (BitPay CEO):200k unconfirmed transactions, time for a hard fork to larger blocks ... 8mb please"" title="Stephen (BitPay CEO):"a typical #bitcoin transaction costs $1.80 now, >200k unconfirmed transactions, time for a hard fork to larger blocks ... 8mb please"" /> submitted by Egon_1 to btc [link] [comments]

There are about 150k unconfirmed bitcoin transactions at the time of writing. High congestion means very high transfer costs. JAXX IS NOT RIPPING YOU OFF so stop moaning, they just use the standard recommended transfer fee. If you don't understand why, do some research on how the blockchain works

There are about 150k unconfirmed bitcoin transactions at the time of writing. High congestion means very high transfer costs. JAXX IS NOT RIPPING YOU OFF so stop moaning, they just use the standard recommended transfer fee. If you don't understand why, do some research on how the blockchain works submitted by wilk007 to jaxx [link] [comments]

Meanwhile in Milan. Pizza was good but it cost me 1 Euro transaction fee. My bitcoins went into 160,000 unconfirmed transaction queue on Monday. Bigger Block Please.

Meanwhile in Milan. Pizza was good but it cost me 1 Euro transaction fee. My bitcoins went into 160,000 unconfirmed transaction queue on Monday. Bigger Block Please. submitted by tokyosilver to btc [link] [comments]

Stephen (BitPay CEO):"a typical #bitcoin transaction costs $1.80 now, >200k unconfirmed transactions, time for a hard fork to larger blocks ... 8mb please"

Stephen (BitPay CEO):200k unconfirmed transactions, time for a hard fork to larger blocks ... 8mb please"" title="Stephen (BitPay CEO):"a typical #bitcoin transaction costs $1.80 now, >200k unconfirmed transactions, time for a hard fork to larger blocks ... 8mb please"" /> submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Meanwhile in Milan. Pizza was good but it cost me 1 Euro transaction fee. My bitcoins went into 160,000 unconfirmed transaction queue on Monday. Bigger Block Please.

Meanwhile in Milan. Pizza was good but it cost me 1 Euro transaction fee. My bitcoins went into 160,000 unconfirmed transaction queue on Monday. Bigger Block Please. submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Ledger Live adds Coin control: Here's why that matters.

Ledger Live adds Coin control: Here's why that matters.
Ledger Live version 2.11.1 (download link) adds Coin control for power users.
The coin control feature gives advanced users more granular control over their wallets. It enables them to change how and which coins are selected when making transactions. This increases their ability to manage their privacy and the network fees they will have to pay to spend their account balance.
More control over your coins

How does it work?

The account balance for Bitcoin and its derivatives consists of all the unspent transaction outputs (UTXOs) in the account. You can think of UTXOs as the coins in a regular wallet. When you receive money, you collect coins in your wallet. Then, when you want to make a payment, you get to choose which coins you pick from your wallet. Do you pick the largest coins first? Or do you want to spend all the smaller value coins to lighten up your wallet? Similar considerations can be made when creating a Bitcoin or Bitcoin derivative (altcoin) transaction.
Before the Coin Control feature was released, all transactions involving Bitcoin (and altcoins) automatically selected their coins using the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) algorithm. This strategy includes the oldest coin in the account, and when the amount is not sufficient the second-oldest coin is added, and so forth.
As of Ledger Live version 2.11.1, users are able to make use of a dedicated Coin Control tool to choose the coin selection strategy and the coins that may be spent.

Using Coin control in Ledger Live

Coin control is available in Advanced options in the Send flow
  1. Click on Send, choose an account to debit, and enter a recipient address. Click on Continue.
  2. Enter an amount and click on Advanced options. You will then see: - The currently selected, default coin selection strategy: Oldest coins first (FIFO). - A toggle to enable Replace-By-Fee (RBF). - A toggle to include coins from unconfirmed, replaceable transactions.
  3. Click on Coin control. The coin control modal opens.
  4. Select a Coin selection strategy from the dropdown menu: - Oldest coins first (FIFO). This is the default strategy that spends the oldest coins first. - Minimize fees (optimize size). This strategy tries to minimize the byte size of the transaction by spending the lowest number of UTXOs. This results in a low network fee. - Minimize future fees (merge coins), This strategy includes the maximum number of inputs so that a potential future price rise does not make smaller UTXOs economically unspendable. If the price of a crypto asset increases too much, small UTXOs may become worth less than the cost of the network fees to spend them.
  5. Select which coins may not be included in the selection by unticking their checkbox. The SELECTED indicator shows which coins will be included in the transaction. By changing the selection strategy and/or coins to include, the user has precise control over which coins end up being spent. The Coins to spend and Change to return indicators show how much is spent from and returned to the account.
  6. Click on Done to return to the Send flow to verify and send the transaction.
The coin control window lets you select the strategy as well as pick the coins. Coins marked SELECTED will be included in the transaction.

Coin status

The following statuses can be displayed for a coin:
  • Coins received in a transaction with 0 confirmations without RBF enabled: PENDING
  • Coins received in a transaction with 0 confirmations with RBF enabled: REPLACEABLE
  • Coins received in a transaction with 1337 confirmations: 1337 CONFIRMATIONS
By enabling the toggle Include coins from unconfirmed, replaceable transactions, replaceable transactions can be selected in the Coin control screen.

The Privacy use case

One of the main use cases for Coin control is to protect one’s privacy. UTXOs are, unfortunately, not perfectly fungible due to their unique history on the blockchain. Therefore, users may want to spend coins from different sources without mixing them together, because this would indicate to an outside observer of the blockchain that these addresses belong to the same account. For instance, if one were to spend coins bought on a KYC exchange, which are associated with the user’s identity, together with coins bought anonymously using cash, the anonymous coins could be linked to the user’s identity.
Another example would be that you would like to prevent spending a high-value coin for smaller purchases because this would unnecessarily show the person you’re paying how much you have. This is similar to not showing the boulanger how much is on your bank account when buying a baguette.

Let us know what you think!

We are excited to release this new feature because we think it will fulfill real needs of an important part of our users. This version of Ledger Live marks an important milestone, but we will continue working on more features that our community wants.
So, we invite you to try out Coin control in Ledger Live and let us know what you think! All feedback is welcome on this thread, on ledgerwallet, and you can send suggestions or get help through our official contact form.
We'd like to close out by underlining our commitment to the Bitcoin community, and our willingness to build the best wallet ecosystem for newbies as well as for power users.
submitted by fabnormal to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Technical: Taproot: Why Activate?

This is a follow-up on https://old.reddit.com/Bitcoin/comments/hqzp14/technical_the_path_to_taproot_activation/
Taproot! Everybody wants it!! But... you might ask yourself: sure, everybody else wants it, but why would I, sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, want it? Surely I can be better than everybody else because I swapped XXX fiat for Bitcoin unlike all those nocoiners?
And it is important for you to know the reasons why you, o sovereign Bitcoiner, would want Taproot activated. After all, your nodes (or the nodes your wallets use, which if you are SPV, you hopefully can pester to your wallet vendoimplementor about) need to be upgraded in order for Taproot activation to actually succeed instead of becoming a hot sticky mess.
First, let's consider some principles of Bitcoin.
I'm sure most of us here would agree that the above are very important principles of Bitcoin and that these are principles we would not be willing to remove. If anything, we would want those principles strengthened (especially the last one, financial privacy, which current Bitcoin is only sporadically strong with: you can get privacy, it just requires effort to do so).
So, how does Taproot affect those principles?

Taproot and Your /Coins

Most HODLers probably HODL their coins in singlesig addresses. Sadly, switching to Taproot would do very little for you (it gives a mild discount at spend time, at the cost of a mild increase in fee at receive time (paid by whoever sends to you, so if it's a self-send from a P2PKH or bech32 address, you pay for this); mostly a wash).
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash, so the Taproot output spends 12 bytes more; spending from a P2WPKH requires revealing a 32-byte public key later, which is not needed with Taproot, and Taproot signatures are about 9 bytes smaller than P2WPKH signatures, but the 32 bytes plus 9 bytes is divided by 4 because of the witness discount, so it saves about 11 bytes; mostly a wash, it increases blockweight by about 1 virtual byte, 4 weight for each Taproot-output-input, compared to P2WPKH-output-input).
However, as your HODLings grow in value, you might start wondering if multisignature k-of-n setups might be better for the security of your savings. And it is in multisignature that Taproot starts to give benefits!
Taproot switches to using Schnorr signing scheme. Schnorr makes key aggregation -- constructing a single public key from multiple public keys -- almost as trivial as adding numbers together. "Almost" because it involves some fairly advanced math instead of simple boring number adding, but hey when was the last time you added up your grocery list prices by hand huh?
With current P2SH and P2WSH multisignature schemes, if you have a 2-of-3 setup, then to spend, you need to provide two different signatures from two different public keys. With Taproot, you can create, using special moon math, a single public key that represents your 2-of-3 setup. Then you just put two of your devices together, have them communicate to each other (this can be done airgapped, in theory, by sending QR codes: the software to do this is not even being built yet, but that's because Taproot hasn't activated yet!), and they will make a single signature to authorize any spend from your 2-of-3 address. That's 73 witness bytes -- 18.25 virtual bytes -- of signatures you save!
And if you decide that your current setup with 1-of-1 P2PKH / P2WPKH addresses is just fine as-is: well, that's the whole point of a softfork: backwards-compatibility; you can receive from Taproot users just fine, and once your wallet is updated for Taproot-sending support, you can send to Taproot users just fine as well!
(P2WPKH and P2WSH -- SegWit v0 -- addresses start with bc1q; Taproot -- SegWit v1 --- addresses start with bc1p, in case you wanted to know the difference; in bech32 q is 0, p is 1)
Now how about HODLers who keep all, or some, of their coins on custodial services? Well, any custodial service worth its salt would be doing at least 2-of-3, or probably something even bigger, like 11-of-15. So your custodial service, if it switched to using Taproot internally, could save a lot more (imagine an 11-of-15 getting reduced from 11 signatures to just 1!), which --- we can only hope! --- should translate to lower fees and better customer service from your custodial service!
So I think we can say, very accurately, that the Bitcoin principle --- that YOU are in control of your money --- can only be helped by Taproot (if you are doing multisignature), and, because P2PKH and P2WPKH remain validly-usable addresses in a Taproot future, will not be harmed by Taproot. Its benefit to this principle might be small (it mostly only benefits multisignature users) but since it has no drawbacks with this (i.e. singlesig users can continue to use P2WPKH and P2PKH still) this is still a nice, tidy win!
(even singlesig users get a minor benefit, in that multisig users will now reduce their blockchain space footprint, so that fees can be kept low for everybody; so for example even if you have your single set of private keys engraved on titanium plates sealed in an airtight box stored in a safe buried in a desert protected by angry nomads riding giant sandworms because you're the frickin' Kwisatz Haderach, you still gain some benefit from Taproot)
And here's the important part: if P2PKH/P2WPKH is working perfectly fine with you and you decide to never use Taproot yourself, Taproot will not affect you detrimentally. First do no harm!

Taproot and Your Contracts

No one is an island, no one lives alone. Give and you shall receive. You know: by trading with other people, you can gain expertise in some obscure little necessity of the world (and greatly increase your productivity in that little field), and then trade the products of your expertise for necessities other people have created, all of you thereby gaining gains from trade.
So, contracts, which are basically enforceable agreements that facilitate trading with people who you do not personally know and therefore might not trust.
Let's start with a simple example. You want to buy some gewgaws from somebody. But you don't know them personally. The seller wants the money, you want their gewgaws, but because of the lack of trust (you don't know them!! what if they're scammers??) neither of you can benefit from gains from trade.
However, suppose both of you know of some entity that both of you trust. That entity can act as a trusted escrow. The entity provides you security: this enables the trade, allowing both of you to get gains from trade.
In Bitcoin-land, this can be implemented as a 2-of-3 multisignature. The three signatories in the multisgnature would be you, the gewgaw seller, and the escrow. You put the payment for the gewgaws into this 2-of-3 multisignature address.
Now, suppose it turns out neither of you are scammers (whaaaat!). You receive the gewgaws just fine and you're willing to pay up for them. Then you and the gewgaw seller just sign a transaction --- you and the gewgaw seller are 2, sufficient to trigger the 2-of-3 --- that spends from the 2-of-3 address to a singlesig the gewgaw seller wants (or whatever address the gewgaw seller wants).
But suppose some problem arises. The seller gave you gawgews instead of gewgaws. Or you decided to keep the gewgaws but not sign the transaction to release the funds to the seller. In either case, the escrow is notified, and if it can sign with you to refund the funds back to you (if the seller was a scammer) or it can sign with the seller to forward the funds to the seller (if you were a scammer).
Taproot helps with this: like mentioned above, it allows multisignature setups to produce only one signature, reducing blockchain space usage, and thus making contracts --- which require multiple people, by definition, you don't make contracts with yourself --- is made cheaper (which we hope enables more of these setups to happen for more gains from trade for everyone, also, moon and lambos).
(technology-wise, it's easier to make an n-of-n than a k-of-n, making a k-of-n would require a complex setup involving a long ritual with many communication rounds between the n participants, but an n-of-n can be done trivially with some moon math. You can, however, make what is effectively a 2-of-3 by using a three-branch SCRIPT: either 2-of-2 of you and seller, OR 2-of-2 of you and escrow, OR 2-of-2 of escrow and seller. Fortunately, Taproot adds a facility to embed a SCRIPT inside a public key, so you can have a 2-of-2 Taprooted address (between you and seller) with a SCRIPT branch that can instead be spent with 2-of-2 (you + escrow) OR 2-of-2 (seller + escrow), which implements the three-branched SCRIPT above. If neither of you are scammers (hopefully the common case) then you both sign using your keys and never have to contact the escrow, since you are just using the escrow public key without coordinating with them (because n-of-n is trivial but k-of-n requires setup with communication rounds), so in the "best case" where both of you are honest traders, you also get a privacy boost, in that the escrow never learns you have been trading on gewgaws, I mean ewww, gawgews are much better than gewgaws and therefore I now judge you for being a gewgaw enthusiast, you filthy gewgawer).

Taproot and Your Contracts, Part 2: Cryptographic Boogaloo

Now suppose you want to buy some data instead of things. For example, maybe you have some closed-source software in trial mode installed, and want to pay the developer for the full version. You want to pay for an activation code.
This can be done, today, by using an HTLC. The developer tells you the hash of the activation code. You pay to an HTLC, paying out to the developer if it reveals the preimage (the activation code), or refunding the money back to you after a pre-agreed timeout. If the developer claims the funds, it has to reveal the preimage, which is the activation code, and you can now activate your software. If the developer does not claim the funds by the timeout, you get refunded.
And you can do that, with HTLCs, today.
Of course, HTLCs do have problems:
Fortunately, with Schnorr (which is enabled by Taproot), we can now use the Scriptless Script constuction by Andrew Poelstra. This Scriptless Script allows a new construction, the PTLC or Pointlocked Timelocked Contract. Instead of hashes and preimages, just replace "hash" with "point" and "preimage" with "scalar".
Or as you might know them: "point" is really "public key" and "scalar" is really a "private key". What a PTLC does is that, given a particular public key, the pointlocked branch can be spent only if the spender reveals the private key of the given public key to you.
Another nice thing with PTLCs is that they are deniable. What appears onchain is just a single 2-of-2 signature between you and the developemanufacturer. It's like a magic trick. This signature has no special watermarks, it's a perfectly normal signature (the pledge). However, from this signature, plus some datta given to you by the developemanufacturer (known as the adaptor signature) you can derive the private key of a particular public key you both agree on (the turn). Anyone scraping the blockchain will just see signatures that look just like every other signature, and as long as nobody manages to hack you and get a copy of the adaptor signature or the private key, they cannot get the private key behind the public key (point) that the pointlocked branch needs (the prestige).
(Just to be clear, the public key you are getting the private key from, is distinct from the public key that the developemanufacturer will use for its funds. The activation key is different from the developer's onchain Bitcoin key, and it is the activation key whose private key you will be learning, not the developer's/manufacturer's onchain Bitcoin key).
So:
Taproot lets PTLCs exist onchain because they enable Schnorr, which is a requirement of PTLCs / Scriptless Script.
(technology-wise, take note that Scriptless Script works only for the "pointlocked" branch of the contract; you need normal Script, or a pre-signed nLockTimed transaction, for the "timelocked" branch. Since Taproot can embed a script, you can have the Taproot pubkey be a 2-of-2 to implement the Scriptless Script "pointlocked" branch, then have a hidden script that lets you recover the funds with an OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY after the timeout if the seller does not claim the funds.)

Quantum Quibbles!

Now if you were really paying attention, you might have noticed this parenthetical:
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash...)
So wait, Taproot uses raw 32-byte public keys, and not public key hashes? Isn't that more quantum-vulnerable??
Well, in theory yes. In practice, they probably are not.
It's not that hashes can be broken by quantum computes --- they're still not. Instead, you have to look at how you spend from a P2WPKH/P2PKH pay-to-public-key-hash.
When you spend from a P2PKH / P2WPKH, you have to reveal the public key. Then Bitcoin hashes it and checks if this matches with the public-key-hash, and only then actually validates the signature for that public key.
So an unconfirmed transaction, floating in the mempools of nodes globally, will show, in plain sight for everyone to see, your public key.
(public keys should be public, that's why they're called public keys, LOL)
And if quantum computers are fast enough to be of concern, then they are probably fast enough that, in the several minutes to several hours from broadcast to confirmation, they have already cracked the public key that is openly broadcast with your transaction. The owner of the quantum computer can now replace your unconfirmed transaction with one that pays the funds to itself. Even if you did not opt-in RBF, miners are still incentivized to support RBF on RBF-disabled transactions.
So the extra hash is not as significant a protection against quantum computers as you might think. Instead, the extra hash-and-compare needed is just extra validation effort.
Further, if you have ever, in the past, spent from the address, then there exists already a transaction indelibly stored on the blockchain, openly displaying the public key from which quantum computers can derive the private key. So those are still vulnerable to quantum computers.
For the most part, the cryptographers behind Taproot (and Bitcoin Core) are of the opinion that quantum computers capable of cracking Bitcoin pubkeys are unlikely to appear within a decade or two.
So:
For now, the homomorphic and linear properties of elliptic curve cryptography provide a lot of benefits --- particularly the linearity property is what enables Scriptless Script and simple multisignature (i.e. multisignatures that are just 1 signature onchain). So it might be a good idea to take advantage of them now while we are still fairly safe against quantum computers. It seems likely that quantum-safe signature schemes are nonlinear (thus losing these advantages).

Summary

I Wanna Be The Taprooter!

So, do you want to help activate Taproot? Here's what you, mister sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, can do!

But I Hate Taproot!!

That's fine!

Discussions About Taproot Activation

submitted by almkglor to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Can you create a transaction 'cannot be confirmed after block x'?

Like the title says; can you construct a transaction and broadcast it such that it must be confirmed by a certain block height or else it is invalid?
Edit - I'm really asking if there's a way to construct a transaction to do with without a double spend/RBF/CPFP.
IE: Broadcast transaction at block 640,000 with a specific 'timelock' that says; transaction is invalid if confirmation is at block-height higher than 640,010.
It would be like the reverse of a traditional 'timelock'; rather than 'can't be spent before block x' this would be 'transaction can only be confirmed before block x', and if it didn't get confirmed at that point, would drop from the mempool as an invalid/unconfirmable transaction.
submitted by grinnersaok to BitcoinBeginners [link] [comments]

[ Bitcoin ] Technical: Taproot: Why Activate?

Topic originally posted in Bitcoin by almkglor [link]
This is a follow-up on https://old.reddit.com/Bitcoin/comments/hqzp14/technical_the_path_to_taproot_activation/
Taproot! Everybody wants it!! But... you might ask yourself: sure, everybody else wants it, but why would I, sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, want it? Surely I can be better than everybody else because I swapped XXX fiat for Bitcoin unlike all those nocoiners?
And it is important for you to know the reasons why you, o sovereign Bitcoiner, would want Taproot activated. After all, your nodes (or the nodes your wallets use, which if you are SPV, you hopefully can pester to your wallet vendoimplementor about) need to be upgraded in order for Taproot activation to actually succeed instead of becoming a hot sticky mess.
First, let's consider some principles of Bitcoin.
I'm sure most of us here would agree that the above are very important principles of Bitcoin and that these are principles we would not be willing to remove. If anything, we would want those principles strengthened (especially the last one, financial privacy, which current Bitcoin is only sporadically strong with: you can get privacy, it just requires effort to do so).
So, how does Taproot affect those principles?

Taproot and Your /Coins

Most HODLers probably HODL their coins in singlesig addresses. Sadly, switching to Taproot would do very little for you (it gives a mild discount at spend time, at the cost of a mild increase in fee at receive time (paid by whoever sends to you, so if it's a self-send from a P2PKH or bech32 address, you pay for this); mostly a wash).
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash, so the Taproot output spends 12 bytes more; spending from a P2WPKH requires revealing a 32-byte public key later, which is not needed with Taproot, and Taproot signatures are about 9 bytes smaller than P2WPKH signatures, but the 32 bytes plus 9 bytes is divided by 4 because of the witness discount, so it saves about 11 bytes; mostly a wash, it increases blockweight by about 1 virtual byte, 4 weight for each Taproot-output-input, compared to P2WPKH-output-input).
However, as your HODLings grow in value, you might start wondering if multisignature k-of-n setups might be better for the security of your savings. And it is in multisignature that Taproot starts to give benefits!
Taproot switches to using Schnorr signing scheme. Schnorr makes key aggregation -- constructing a single public key from multiple public keys -- almost as trivial as adding numbers together. "Almost" because it involves some fairly advanced math instead of simple boring number adding, but hey when was the last time you added up your grocery list prices by hand huh?
With current P2SH and P2WSH multisignature schemes, if you have a 2-of-3 setup, then to spend, you need to provide two different signatures from two different public keys. With Taproot, you can create, using special moon math, a single public key that represents your 2-of-3 setup. Then you just put two of your devices together, have them communicate to each other (this can be done airgapped, in theory, by sending QR codes: the software to do this is not even being built yet, but that's because Taproot hasn't activated yet!), and they will make a single signature to authorize any spend from your 2-of-3 address. That's 73 witness bytes -- 18.25 virtual bytes -- of signatures you save!
And if you decide that your current setup with 1-of-1 P2PKH / P2WPKH addresses is just fine as-is: well, that's the whole point of a softfork: backwards-compatibility; you can receive from Taproot users just fine, and once your wallet is updated for Taproot-sending support, you can send to Taproot users just fine as well!
(P2WPKH and P2WSH -- SegWit v0 -- addresses start with bc1q; Taproot -- SegWit v1 --- addresses start with bc1p, in case you wanted to know the difference; in bech32 q is 0, p is 1)
Now how about HODLers who keep all, or some, of their coins on custodial services? Well, any custodial service worth its salt would be doing at least 2-of-3, or probably something even bigger, like 11-of-15. So your custodial service, if it switched to using Taproot internally, could save a lot more (imagine an 11-of-15 getting reduced from 11 signatures to just 1!), which --- we can only hope! --- should translate to lower fees and better customer service from your custodial service!
So I think we can say, very accurately, that the Bitcoin principle --- that YOU are in control of your money --- can only be helped by Taproot (if you are doing multisignature), and, because P2PKH and P2WPKH remain validly-usable addresses in a Taproot future, will not be harmed by Taproot. Its benefit to this principle might be small (it mostly only benefits multisignature users) but since it has no drawbacks with this (i.e. singlesig users can continue to use P2WPKH and P2PKH still) this is still a nice, tidy win!
(even singlesig users get a minor benefit, in that multisig users will now reduce their blockchain space footprint, so that fees can be kept low for everybody; so for example even if you have your single set of private keys engraved on titanium plates sealed in an airtight box stored in a safe buried in a desert protected by angry nomads riding giant sandworms because you're the frickin' Kwisatz Haderach, you still gain some benefit from Taproot)
And here's the important part: if P2PKH/P2WPKH is working perfectly fine with you and you decide to never use Taproot yourself, Taproot will not affect you detrimentally. First do no harm!

Taproot and Your Contracts

No one is an island, no one lives alone. Give and you shall receive. You know: by trading with other people, you can gain expertise in some obscure little necessity of the world (and greatly increase your productivity in that little field), and then trade the products of your expertise for necessities other people have created, all of you thereby gaining gains from trade.
So, contracts, which are basically enforceable agreements that facilitate trading with people who you do not personally know and therefore might not trust.
Let's start with a simple example. You want to buy some gewgaws from somebody. But you don't know them personally. The seller wants the money, you want their gewgaws, but because of the lack of trust (you don't know them!! what if they're scammers??) neither of you can benefit from gains from trade.
However, suppose both of you know of some entity that both of you trust. That entity can act as a trusted escrow. The entity provides you security: this enables the trade, allowing both of you to get gains from trade.
In Bitcoin-land, this can be implemented as a 2-of-3 multisignature. The three signatories in the multisgnature would be you, the gewgaw seller, and the escrow. You put the payment for the gewgaws into this 2-of-3 multisignature address.
Now, suppose it turns out neither of you are scammers (whaaaat!). You receive the gewgaws just fine and you're willing to pay up for them. Then you and the gewgaw seller just sign a transaction --- you and the gewgaw seller are 2, sufficient to trigger the 2-of-3 --- that spends from the 2-of-3 address to a singlesig the gewgaw seller wants (or whatever address the gewgaw seller wants).
But suppose some problem arises. The seller gave you gawgews instead of gewgaws. Or you decided to keep the gewgaws but not sign the transaction to release the funds to the seller. In either case, the escrow is notified, and if it can sign with you to refund the funds back to you (if the seller was a scammer) or it can sign with the seller to forward the funds to the seller (if you were a scammer).
Taproot helps with this: like mentioned above, it allows multisignature setups to produce only one signature, reducing blockchain space usage, and thus making contracts --- which require multiple people, by definition, you don't make contracts with yourself --- is made cheaper (which we hope enables more of these setups to happen for more gains from trade for everyone, also, moon and lambos).
(technology-wise, it's easier to make an n-of-n than a k-of-n, making a k-of-n would require a complex setup involving a long ritual with many communication rounds between the n participants, but an n-of-n can be done trivially with some moon math. You can, however, make what is effectively a 2-of-3 by using a three-branch SCRIPT: either 2-of-2 of you and seller, OR 2-of-2 of you and escrow, OR 2-of-2 of escrow and seller. Fortunately, Taproot adds a facility to embed a SCRIPT inside a public key, so you can have a 2-of-2 Taprooted address (between you and seller) with a SCRIPT branch that can instead be spent with 2-of-2 (you + escrow) OR 2-of-2 (seller + escrow), which implements the three-branched SCRIPT above. If neither of you are scammers (hopefully the common case) then you both sign using your keys and never have to contact the escrow, since you are just using the escrow public key without coordinating with them (because n-of-n is trivial but k-of-n requires setup with communication rounds), so in the "best case" where both of you are honest traders, you also get a privacy boost, in that the escrow never learns you have been trading on gewgaws, I mean ewww, gawgews are much better than gewgaws and therefore I now judge you for being a gewgaw enthusiast, you filthy gewgawer).

Taproot and Your Contracts, Part 2: Cryptographic Boogaloo

Now suppose you want to buy some data instead of things. For example, maybe you have some closed-source software in trial mode installed, and want to pay the developer for the full version. You want to pay for an activation code.
This can be done, today, by using an HTLC. The developer tells you the hash of the activation code. You pay to an HTLC, paying out to the developer if it reveals the preimage (the activation code), or refunding the money back to you after a pre-agreed timeout. If the developer claims the funds, it has to reveal the preimage, which is the activation code, and you can now activate your software. If the developer does not claim the funds by the timeout, you get refunded.
And you can do that, with HTLCs, today.
Of course, HTLCs do have problems:
Fortunately, with Schnorr (which is enabled by Taproot), we can now use the Scriptless Script constuction by Andrew Poelstra. This Scriptless Script allows a new construction, the PTLC or Pointlocked Timelocked Contract. Instead of hashes and preimages, just replace "hash" with "point" and "preimage" with "scalar".
Or as you might know them: "point" is really "public key" and "scalar" is really a "private key". What a PTLC does is that, given a particular public key, the pointlocked branch can be spent only if the spender reveals the private key of the given private key to you.
Another nice thing with PTLCs is that they are deniable. What appears onchain is just a single 2-of-2 signature between you and the developemanufacturer. It's like a magic trick. This signature has no special watermarks, it's a perfectly normal signature (the pledge). However, from this signature, plus some datta given to you by the developemanufacturer (known as the adaptor signature) you can derive the private key of a particular public key you both agree on (the turn). Anyone scraping the blockchain will just see signatures that look just like every other signature, and as long as nobody manages to hack you and get a copy of the adaptor signature or the private key, they cannot get the private key behind the public key (point) that the pointlocked branch needs (the prestige).
(Just to be clear, the public key you are getting the private key from, is distinct from the public key that the developemanufacturer will use for its funds. The activation key is different from the developer's onchain Bitcoin key, and it is the activation key whose private key you will be learning, not the developer's/manufacturer's onchain Bitcoin key).
So:
Taproot lets PTLCs exist onchain because they enable Schnorr, which is a requirement of PTLCs / Scriptless Script.
(technology-wise, take note that Scriptless Script works only for the "pointlocked" branch of the contract; you need normal Script, or a pre-signed nLockTimed transaction, for the "timelocked" branch. Since Taproot can embed a script, you can have the Taproot pubkey be a 2-of-2 to implement the Scriptless Script "pointlocked" branch, then have a hidden script that lets you recover the funds with an OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY after the timeout if the seller does not claim the funds.)

Quantum Quibbles!

Now if you were really paying attention, you might have noticed this parenthetical:
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash...)
So wait, Taproot uses raw 32-byte public keys, and not public key hashes? Isn't that more quantum-vulnerable??
Well, in theory yes. In practice, they probably are not.
It's not that hashes can be broken by quantum computes --- they're still not. Instead, you have to look at how you spend from a P2WPKH/P2PKH pay-to-public-key-hash.
When you spend from a P2PKH / P2WPKH, you have to reveal the public key. Then Bitcoin hashes it and checks if this matches with the public-key-hash, and only then actually validates the signature for that public key.
So an unconfirmed transaction, floating in the mempools of nodes globally, will show, in plain sight for everyone to see, your public key.
(public keys should be public, that's why they're called public keys, LOL)
And if quantum computers are fast enough to be of concern, then they are probably fast enough that, in the several minutes to several hours from broadcast to confirmation, they have already cracked the public key that is openly broadcast with your transaction. The owner of the quantum computer can now replace your unconfirmed transaction with one that pays the funds to itself. Even if you did not opt-in RBF, miners are still incentivized to support RBF on RBF-disabled transactions.
So the extra hash is not as significant a protection against quantum computers as you might think. Instead, the extra hash-and-compare needed is just extra validation effort.
Further, if you have ever, in the past, spent from the address, then there exists already a transaction indelibly stored on the blockchain, openly displaying the public key from which quantum computers can derive the private key. So those are still vulnerable to quantum computers.
For the most part, the cryptographers behind Taproot (and Bitcoin Core) are of the opinion that quantum computers capable of cracking Bitcoin pubkeys are unlikely to appear within a decade or two.
So:
For now, the homomorphic and linear properties of elliptic curve cryptography provide a lot of benefits --- particularly the linearity property is what enables Scriptless Script and simple multisignature (i.e. multisignatures that are just 1 signature onchain). So it might be a good idea to take advantage of them now while we are still fairly safe against quantum computers. It seems likely that quantum-safe signature schemes are nonlinear (thus losing these advantages).

Summary

I Wanna Be The Taprooter!

So, do you want to help activate Taproot? Here's what you, mister sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, can do!

But I Hate Taproot!!

That's fine!

Discussions About Taproot Activation

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submitted by anticensor_bot to u/anticensor_bot [link] [comments]

March 16, 2017: Rising Bitcoin fees force Xapo and other exchanges to stop paying miner transaction fees for users.

March 16, 2017: Rising Bitcoin fees force Xapo and other exchanges to stop paying miner transaction fees for users.
Three years ago today Xapo stopped paying Bitcoin miner transaction fees for users because it was getting too expensive for them.
Jamie Redman had some good coverage for Bitcoin.com about it.
The news follows almost two weeks worth of backed up transactions filling the mempool. Currently, the backlog has over 200,000 unconfirmed transactions at the time of writing and has been this way for the past 36 hours.
So far lots of people have been waiting over six hours to three days for one confirmation and have been complaining throughout forums. Furthermore, fees are higher than ever as May 16 reveals many people were paying upwards of $2 per transaction. Last week the average transaction cost for a normal 226KB tx was $1-1.50, and people still criticized wait times. People complaining about rising fees could be seen coming from both small blockers and big blockers over the past week.
https://preview.redd.it/mw2quvx8i5z41.png?width=966&format=png&auto=webp&s=77f04ccff5e9169a0cca8a00e26fd9f417117c42
submitted by mkgll to btc [link] [comments]

Bitcoin transfer fees have risen to a two-year high

The bitcoin network still cannot return to normal after halving. On May 20, the average transaction fee level rose to $6.633, the highest level since June 2018. A month ago, before halving, the figure was 10 times lower.
The size of the mempool - the volume of unconfirmed transactions - increased to the values of the winter of 2018. On May 21, it was 94.41 Mb. Against this background, the cost of BTC dropped from $9,600 to $8,800. Now the average market price of bitcoin is $9,167, in 24 hrs the cryptocurrency has lost 2.10% in price.
On May 11, the block reward was halved in the Bitcoin network from 12.5 BTC to 6.25 BTC.
submitted by bestchange_pr to bestchange [link] [comments]

[Weekly Report] BSV transaction fee is lower

[Weekly Report] BSV transaction fee is lower
Dear friends of LivesOne,

As block sizes get bigger and technology improves, BSV community hopes that more people can use the BSV public data ledger to reduce transaction fee.
On May 13, TAAL, the transaction processor, processed a block of 309MB in size, which contains 1178322 transactions, with a total transaction fee of up to 0.788BSV. If denominated in legal tender, the average fee per transaction is about 0.0009 Yuan RMB.

https://preview.redd.it/l5as5227fuz41.png?width=1240&format=png&auto=webp&s=4abcb3767200719104ccdc54167eb74021666587

  • Current rate of BSV transaction fee
In the Bitcoin market, miners participate in blockchain mining with an aim to make profits. However, as the Bitcoin network recently experienced its halving, transaction fees gradually become more important. The future competition will focus on those transaction processors who can handle more network transactions.
At the beginning of this year, MemPool, the leader of BSV mining pool, announced that they would work with Tall and Coingeek mining, bitcoin mining giants,to support enterprise blockchain applications and reduce the transaction fees. The statement marks the birth of a new trend in which mining companies seek more sustainable profit models to ensure their long-term development.
Transaction processor is expected to adjust its BSV transaction fee rates as relevant to respond to market forces. It will be implementing the following changes to transaction fees charged by its cloud computing operations on the BSV network:
  1. A reduction in the transaction acceptance fee (-blockmintxfee) from 1 satoshi/byte to 0.5 satoshis/byte.
  2. A reduction in the relay fee (-minrelaytxfee which is the minimum fee required for double spend protection and for relaying of a transaction) from 1 satoshi/byte to 0.25 satoshis/byte.
  3. In an additional, but unrelated, change the restrictive limit of 25 unconfirmed ancestors will be immediately raised from 25 to 50.

  • Expectation of BSV transaction fee
Many enterprises are exploring blockchain applications to improve their business. These projects are becoming more and more common, but there are some challenges in the application of the public chain. Bitcoin transaction fees are not expressed in legal tender, but in "sat / byte". Therefore, transaction fees in legal tender price will fluctuate with the fluctuation of the price of bitcoin.
TAAL promises to regularly check the lower BSV transaction fees to maintain stable transaction fees in legal tender. Large enterprises usually want to be able to predict their costs, so stable transaction fees are expected to attract more enterprises to use BSV for data applications.
In addition, due to the difficulty in corporate policy and accounting treatment, enterprises do not or cannot show holding digital assets on their balance sheets. Business participants in the BSV ecosystem have recently begun to explore alternate transaction fee models that provide, in fiat currency terms, greater reliability for BSV business applications – including business deals for miners to directly handle a particular application’s set of transactions for negotiated fee rates or development of tools that enable greater fee customization to be offered by miners to applications.
This evolving fee marketplace is new to bitcoin; it was not possible on the Bitcoin Core network due to its smaller block size and significantly higher transaction fees. This new fee marketplace is only recently enabled by BSV’s greater data and microtransaction capabilities. It is expected that this will bring more users to BSV and attract more partners to strengthen its ecosystem.
With the increasing of BSV trading volume, we can also see the further reduction of transaction fee rate. BSV promises an exciting blockchain future. LivesOne's vision is to enable more ordinary people to use better blockchain applications, and lower fee will help LivesOne realize its vision. LivesOne is eager to participate in the future construction of blockchain with you.

Symbiosism Economy Foundation
May 20, 2020
submitted by LivesoneToken to LivesOne [link] [comments]

Replace By Fee - A Counter Argument By Mike Hearn

Replace By Fee - A Counter Argument By Mike Hearn submitted by bubbasparse to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

BTC is now pick 2 of 3: Low fees/Fast confirmation times/Security

In some recent comments Bitcoin Core supporters are telling people Lightning is optional and I agree.
However if you think Lightning is optional then you limit your options even further when using Bitcoin. Based on today's current state of Bitcoin here are your options when using Bitcoin to send cash:
1) onchain Bitcoin with a low fee: Security + Low fee = Slow confirmation time
2) onchain Bitcoin with a high fee: Security + High fee = Fast confirmation time (So long as no one outbids you out of the block during times of high volume)
3) Lightning: Low fee + Fast transaction time(no confirmation as Lightning transactions are not confirmed onchain until you close your channel) = No Security
examples of each is:
1) Tony Vays sent a Bitcoin transaction with a "low fee" of $0.25 that took 11 hours to confirm and probably would have taken longer if SlushPool didn't manually add his transaction. I'm being liberal with "low" because anyone using cash today does not pay $0.25 extra for a transaction to buy coffee.
2) Exchange withdrawals: Usually exchanges raise the fee several levels higher to ensure the confirmation goes through sooner than later. You've probably heard of /bitcoin users complaining about this, but this is just the cost of good business. Exchanges don't want users complaining about waiting 11 hours and creating unnecessary support tickets because Bitcoin is congested again.
3) Lightning has low fees and fast tx times, but until you close that Lightning channel that transaction is still unconfirmed onchain and anything can happen. This is why /bitcoin users recommend using watchtower services to secure your Lightning funds, as someone must always be watching over your funds to prevent them from being stolen. If you stay offline for too long your funds may be stolen. Until your close your LN channel your must check in on your Lightning funds periodically to defend against theft attempts as you become the security of your funds, not the Bitcoin blockchain.
So this is the convoluted state of Bitcoin today. A Rube Goldberg vision of p2p digital cash where first you must decide on your priorities and only then then transfer funds between Bitcoin or Lightning as necessary before deciding to send someone cash. Not very frictionless cash is it...
Or you can just use Bitcon Cash which has none of these complications and just works.
edit1: Bitcoin.org acknowledges the Bitcoin's degradation of utility as well: https://www.ccn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Bitcoin.org-Transaction-Fees-1024x555.jpg
submitted by 500239 to btc [link] [comments]

I found a $600k BCH theft that has gone unnoticed

Hello all, I'm (among other things) a graduate student getting a master's degree in cybersecurity. This last quarter for one of my classes, I was tasked to examine and recreate an exploit. For the actual exploit I was examining the "anyone can spend" segwit addresses on the BCH chain, and in my research I found a $600k theft that seems to have gone completely unnoticed.
You all might recall this $600k theft of segwit addresses, but it happened again in mid-February 2018 and there has been zero news about it.
BCH block 517171 contains solely segwit-stealing transactions. If you look at any given transaction, the inputs are all segwit program hashes spending a P2SH segwit output. I only caught it by accident, as I was originally going to talk about the publicized November attack.
The interesting thing I discovered about this was that it's harder to have stolen that segwit money than most people think. Both Unlimited and ABC nodes do not relay segwit-spending transactions, and Bitcoin ABC hard-coded in fRequireStandard, so you couldn't even force-relay them with a conf option. On top of that, miners keep their node IPs private for obvious avoiding-ddos-and-sybil-attack reasons, which means it's impossible to directly send transactions to miners. This means that the only way to actually execute this attack was to setup one's own mining pool running on a custom-modified client to allow non-standard transactions. Then you'd have to get enough hash power to mine a block yourself. I estimated the cost of renting enough hash power to do this at the time as around $30k-$60k to have a greater than 90% chance of mining a block within a 3 month window.
In order to simulate the attack, I spun up BTC, LTC, and BCH nodes in Docker, and wrote a Python script. The Python script started at segwit activation on BTC and LTC and it scanned every transaction in every block looking for P2SH segwit inputs as well as native segwit outputs, since these are the necessary hash pre-images to spend P2SH segwit money on the BCH chain. The script then also scanned the BCH chain for any native segwit outputs, as well as recording all P2SH outputs. (This was all saved in a MySQL database.) Then, at any point in time, I could simply query for BCH unspent native segwit outputs as well as P2SH outputs for which I had a known segwit hash pre-image. (If this was an attack I was doing real-time, I would probably also have a large mempool on each node and monitor unconfirmed tx's for useful info as well, but since this was after the fact, I just queried blocks sequentially.)
For the mining node that runs the pool, it would need to be firewalled behind (i.e. only connected to) an unmodified node in blocks-only mode, so that the segwit hash pre-images aren't transmitted out to the network, and so that no other unconfirmed transactions are transmitted in to the mining node. (The mining node should only be filling its block with segwit tx's in order to maximize the gain from the attack.)
Then a script should run continuously to grab segwit utxos from the MySQL database and construct high-fee transactions to send directly to the mining node. Unlike the November attack, each input should be spent in its own individual transaction, so that in the event it is individually spent, I don't negate a tx with other inputs. The overhead on having different transactions for each input is only about 8 extra bytes (the tx version and the locktime), so I think this is a good trade-off.
Then, the attacker simply rents hashing power and points it at his secret pool.
By the time February rolled around and the attack happened, my MySQL database had about 40 million BCH P2SH outputs and each query took about 3 minutes to execute. This of course would have been fine in the 10-minute block world of Bitcoin and BCH, but it means that I stopped my Python script after that time, so I don't know about any possible other attacks that happened before the clean stack rule was hard-forked into BCH.
It was pretty interesting to work through how this attack must have happened, and it was significantly harder to execute than I thought it would be given that all the money was "anyone can spend".
However, the most interesting thing about all this is that nobody has noticed. There is literally no news or mention of block 517171 or any of the transactions in it. My theory is that it is money that nobody misses -- i.e. misprogrammed custom wallet software for BTC nodes accidentally also sent out BCH transactions to the same address, given that BTC and BCH shared the same history until August 2017. And whatever person or entity is running those nodes is only thinking about BTC money and is completely oblivious to its misprogrammed problem of shipping BCH to segwit P2SH addresses.
Obviously, that's just a theory, but I think it's pretty reasonable. Given the intense community divide, I think it's very possible that a number of BTC users simply ignored money on the BCH chain, even though it's "free money" for them, simply out of ideological hatred.
Whatever the case, nobody has posted anywhere complaining of money stolen in that block. It seems to have gone completely unnoticed. (Which is why I'm posting this.) It was an interesting case study and I'd be curious to hear if anybody has any addition information or thoughts about it. I believe this was a different person than the November theft, because the way it was done was different -- the November theft had all the money in one transaction, but this February theft was done with separate individual transactions. Additionally worth noting is that the address which received the bulk of the money is still active, which means they're still out there.
Anyway, I thought this was interesting and worth posting.
submitted by exmachinalibertas to btc [link] [comments]

How much would a Bitcoin node handling 1GB blocks cost today? I did some back-on-the-envelope calculations.

1GB blocks would be able to confirm more than 5000tx/s. That would be VISA-level scale (which handles, on average, 1736tx/s). We often hear that we shouldn't raise the blocksize because then nodes would become too expensive to run. But how expensive exactly?
We have the following costs to take into account:
For now, I'm going to assume a non-pruned full node (i.e. a node that stores all transactions of the blockchain) for personal use, i.e. for a computer built at home. I'll add in the calculations for a pruned node at the end, which would likely be the prefered option for people who merely want to verify the blockchain for themselves. If you don't care about the assumptions and calculations, you can just jump right to the end of this post. If you spotted any error, please inform me and I'll update my calculation.

Storage

There's, on average, one block every 10 minutes, that is 144 every day and 4320 blocks every thirty days. I was able to find a 3TB HDD for $47,50 on Amazon, that is $0.018/GB. Storing all blocks with all transactions of a month (4320GB) would be $78.96/mo. Prices for storage halved from 2014 to 2017, so we can assume that to half in 2022, thus we can reasonably assume it'd cost around $40/mo. in 2022.
But would such an inexpensive hard disk be able to keep up with writing all the data? I found a comparable cheap HDD which can write 127MB/s sequentially (which would be the writing mode of Bitcoin). That would be enough even for 76GB blocks!
Edit: For the UTXO set, we need very fast storage for both reading and writing. Peter__R, in his comment below, estimates this to be 1TB for 4 billion users (which would make ~46,000tx/s if everyone would make 1tx/day, so id'd require about 10GB blocks). jtoomim seems more pessimistic on that front, he says that much of that has to be in RAM. I'll add the $315 I've calculated below to account for that (which would be rather optimistic, keep in mind).

Bandwidth

Bandwidth is more complicated, because that can't just be shipped around like HDDs. I'll just take prices for my country, Germany, using the provider T-online, because I don't know how it works in the US. You can plug in your own numbers based on the calculations below.
1GB blocks/10 minute mean 1.7MB/s. However, this is an average, and we need some wiggle room for transaction spikes, for example at Christmas or Black Friday. VISA handles 150 million transactions per day, that is 1736tx/s, but can handle up to 24,000tx/s (source). So we should be able to handle 13.8x the average throughput, which would be 1.7MB/s x 13.8 = 23.46M/s, or 187.68Mbit/s. The plan on T-online for 250Mbit/s (translated) would be 54.95€/mo (plus setup minus a discount for the first 6 months which seems to cancel out so we'll ignore it), which would be $61.78/mo. This plan is an actual flatrate, so we don't have to worry about hitting any download limit.
Note, however, that we don't order bandwidth for only our Bitcoin node, but also for personal use. If we only needed 2MB/s for personal use, the plan would be 34.95€, thus our node would actually only cost the difference of 20€ per month, or $22.50/mo. Nielsen's Law of Internet Bandwidth claims that a high-end user's connection speed grows by 50% per year. If we assume this is true for pricing too, the bandwidth cost for ~200Mbit/s/mo. would go down to 12.5% (forgot how exponential growth works) 29.6% of its today's cost by 2022, which decreases our number to $2.81/mo. $6.66/mo.
Edit: jtoomim, markblundeberg and CaptainPatent point out that the node would have a much higher bandwidth for announcing transactions and uploading historical blocks. In theory, it would not be necessary to do any of those things and still be able to verify one's own transactions, by never broadcasting any transactions. That would be quite leechy behaviour, though. If we were to pick a higher data plan to get 1000MBit/s downstream and 500MBit/s upstream, it would cost 119.95€/mo., however this plan isn't widely available yet (both links in German). 500MBit/s of upstream would give us max. 21 connected nodes at transaction spikes, or max. 294 connected nodes at average load. That would cost $39.85 in 2022 (with correct exponential growth).

CPU/Memory

CPU/Memory will be bought once and can then run for tens of years, so we'll count these as setup costs. The specs needed, of course, depend on the optimization of the node software, but we'll assume the current bottlenecks will have been removed once running a node actually becomes demanding hardware-wise.
This paper establishes that a 2.4GHz Intel Westmere (Xeon E5620) CPU can verify 71000 signatures per second... which can be bought for $32.88 a pair on Ebay (note: this CPU is from Q1'10). We'd need to verify 76659tx/s at spikes (taking the 13.8x number), so that pair of CPUs (handle 142,000tx/s) seem to just fit right in (given one signature per tx). We'd also have to account for multiple signatures per transaction and all the other parts of verification of transactions, but it seems like the CPU costs are neglegible anyway if we don't buy the freshest hardware available. ~$100 at current prices seem reasonable. Given Moore's Law, we can assume that prices for CPUs half every two years (transistor count x1.4162), so in three years, the CPU(s) should cost around $35.22 ($100/1.4163).
For memory, we again have to take into account the transaction spikes. If we're very unlucky, and transactions spike and there won't be a block for ~1h, the mempool can become very large. If we take the factor of 13.8x from above, and 1h of unconfirmed transactions (20,000,000tx usually, 276,000,000tx on spikes), we'd need 82.8GB (for 300B per transaction).
I found 32GB of RAM (with ECC) for $106, so three of those give us 96GB of RAM for $318 and plenty remaining space for building hash trees, connection management and the operating system. Buying used hardware doesn't seem to decrease the cost significantly (we actually do need a lot of RAM, compared to CPU power).
Price of RAM seems to decrease by a factor of x100 every 10 years (x1.58510), so we can expect 96GB to cost around $79.89 ($318/1.5853) in 2022.
Of course, CPU and memory need to be compatible, which I haven't taken into account. Chug a mainboard (~$150) and a power supply (~$50) into the mix, and the total would be just over $600 for today's prices. Even if mainboard and power supply prices remain the same, we'd still only have to pay around $315 for the whole setup in 2022.

Electricity

I found the following power consumptions:
So we'd have 129W 147.6W + N*6W. Electricity cost average at 12ct/kWh in the US, in Germany this is higher at 30.22ct/kWh. In the US, it would cost $11.14 $12.75 + N*$0.52 (P*12ct/kWh / 1000 * 24h/day *30days / 100ct/$), in Germany 28.06€ 32.11€ + N*1.30€.
At the end of the first year, it would cost $20.12 $21.73/mo. in the US and 50.52€ 54.57€/mo. in Germany.
At the end of the second year, it would cost $29.11 $30.72/mo. for the US and 72.98€ 77.03€/mo. for Germany. It increases by $8.98/mo. per year in the US and by 22.46€/mo. per year in Germany.
Electricity prices in Germany have increased over time due to increased taxation; in the US the price increase has been below inflation rate the last two decades. As it's difficult to predict price changes here, I'm going to assume prices will remain the same.

Conclusion

In summary, we get:
If we add everything up, for today's prices, we get (E: updated all following numbers, but only changed slightly) $132/mo. (US), $187/mo. (DE) for the second year and $71.92/mo. $78/mo. (US), $115.79/mo. $124/mo. (DE) in 2022.
It definitely is quite a bit of money, but consider what that machine would actually do; it would basically do the equivalent of VISA's payment verification multiple times over, which is an amazing feat. Also, piano lessons cost around $50-$100 each, so if we consider a Bitcoin hobbyist, he would still pay much less for his hobby than a piano player, who'd pay about $400 per month. So it's entirely reasonable to assume that even if we had 1GB blocks, there would still be lots of people running full-nodes just so.
How about pruned nodes? Here, we only have to store the Unspent Transaction Output Set (UTXO set), which currently clocks in at 2.8GB. If blocks get 1000 times bigger, we can assume the UTXO set to become 2.8TB. I'll assume ordinary HDD's aren't goint to cut it for reading/writing the UTXO set at that scale, so we'll take some NVMe SSDs for that, currently priced at $105/TB. Three of them would increase our setup by $315 to $915, but decrease our monthly costs. E: However this UTXO set is also required for the non-pruned node, therefore the setup costs stay at $915. Even in the highest power state, the 3 SSDs will need only 18.6W in total, so we'll get a constant 147.6W for the whole system.
In total, this is:
In total, this is $35.25/mo. in the US and $58.57/mo. in Germany for today's prices, or (E:) $19.41/mo. (US) and (E:) $42.73/mo. (DE) in 2022's prices. Which looks very affordable even for a non-hobbyist.
E: spelling
E²: I've added the 3 NVEe SSDs for the UTXO set, as pointed out by others and fixed an error with exponentials, as I figured out.
submitted by eyeofpython to btc [link] [comments]

16000 we are coming

I am little disappointed that I bought some bits on high
but I am more excited to now buy more
submitted by sagar6191 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Did anyone else get very long email with the subject "【MTGOX】同意事項/Terms of Consent" today?

This was the full email. There were also 2 PDF attachments. The only part I have changed is where I've redacted my "creditor number". Please discuss what you think about it.
(English follows Japanese)
債権者様(債権者番号:XXXXXXXXXXX)
本メールは、株式会社MTGOX(以下「MTGOX」といいます。)の破産手続において破産債権の届出をしたものの、MTGOXの民事再生手続(以下「本民事再生手続」といいます。)において、再生債権の届出をしておらず、MTGOXのデータベースに存在した残高が自認債権として認められた債権者の方にお送りしています。
貴殿/貴社について認められた自認債権については、添付PDFファイルに記載しておりますのでご確認ください。
本民事再生手続において、届出債権者の方には、弁済を含めた諸手続を円滑に進めるため、本民事再生手続に関する同意事項に同意いただいております。しかし、貴殿/貴社は債権届出をしていないことから、未だ当該同意事項へ同意いただいておりません。弁済を含めた今後の手続を円滑に進めるためには、貴殿/貴社にも同様の同意事項に対して同意していただく必要があります。
そこで、本メールの末尾に記載しました「民事再生手続に関する同意事項」又は本メールに添付しました「民事再生手続に関する同意事項」(内容は同一です。)をご確認いただき、内容に同意いただける場合には、下記の文言を記載して、本メールに直接返信してください。
「私は、MTGOXの民事再生手続について、再生管財人から送付された「民事再生手続に関する同意事項」について同意及び表明いたします。」
再生管財人は、今後も、東京地方裁判所と協議しながら、適切な民事再生手続の遂行に努めてまいりますので、ご理解ご協力の程宜しくお願い申し上げます。
再生債務者株式会社MTGOX 再生管財人弁護士小林信明
To creditor (creditor number: XXXXXXXXXXX)
You have received this email because you are a creditor ofMtGox Co., Ltd. (“MtGox”) who filed a proof of bankruptcy claim(s) under the previous bankruptcy proceedings forMtGox but did not file a proof of rehabilitation claim(s) under the civil rehabilitation proceedings for MtGox (the “Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings”) and whose remaining balance on the MtGox database was approved by the Rehabilitation Trustee as a self-approved rehabilitation claim(s) (i.e., a rehabilitation claim that was not filed but accepted by the trustee voluntarily in accordance with the Civil Rehabilitation Act).
Your self-approved rehabilitation claim(s) are detailed in the attached PDF file for your review.
In the Civil Rehabilitation Proceeding, the rehabilitation creditors who filed their proofs of rehabilitation claim agreed to the terms of consent regarding the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings to proceed smoothly with various procedures including repayment. However, since you have not filed a claim, you have not yet agreed to these terms of consent. In order to facilitate various proceedings, your consent to the terms is required.
Accordingly, we hereby stated the “Terms of Consent Regarding the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings” at the end of this email, as well as attached the same to this email. Please carefully read the terms therein, and if you agree to the terms, please reply to this email and state the sentence below in the body of your reply.
“I/We hereby agree to and represent as set forth in the “Terms of Consent Regarding the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings” sent by the rehabilitation trustee, in relation to the civil rehabilitation proceedings for MtGox Co., Ltd.”
The rehabilitation trustee will continue to make an effort to conduct the Civil Rehabilitation Proceeding appropriately and in consultation with the Tokyo District Court, and the rehabilitation trustee would appreciate the understanding and cooperation of all concerned parties.
Rehabilitation Debtor: MtGox Co., Ltd. Rehabilitation Trustee: Nobuaki Kobayashi, Attorney-at-law
事件番号 平成29年(再)第35号 / Case Number 2017 (sai) No. 35 再生債務者 株式会社MTGOX / Rehabilitation Debtor: MTGOX Co., Ltd.
民事再生手続に関する同意事項 Terms of Consent Regarding the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings
1. 私/当社は、上記債権者番号の自認債権者本人であり、私/当社が届け出た情報は真実、正確かつ完全であること。その違反に起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害、損失、債務、コスト又は費用(以下「損害等」という。)について、株式会社MTGOX(以下「MTGOX」という。)及びMTGOXの民事再生手続(東京地方裁判所平成29年(再)第35号。以下「本民事再生手続」という。)における管財人(その代理及び補佐を含み、以下「再生管財人」という。)は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 I am/We are the creditor of self-approved rehabilitation claims that has the above creditor number, and I/we represent that the information that I/we have provided therein is true, accurate, and complete. MtGox Co., Ltd. (“MTGOX”) and the trustee (including deputy trustees and assistant trustees; the “Rehabilitation Trustee”) of the MTGOX civil rehabilitation proceedings (Tokyo District Court; 2017 (sai) Case No. 35; the “Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings”) are not liable in any respect for any damage, loss, liability, cost or expense (“Damages”) arising out of or in connection with any breach of such representation, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
2. 再生管財人の故意によらず、ビットコイン及びビットコインから分岐した他の仮想通貨(以下「フォークコイン」といい、ビットコインと総称して「ビットコイン等」という。)の技術上の問題・障害等に起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等(ビットコイン等又は金銭による弁済を受領できないことによる損害を含むが、これに限られない。)について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with any technical issue, impediment, or other ground, in the absence of without willful misconduct by the Rehabilitation Trustee, regarding Bitcoin or any other cryptocurrency split from Bitcoin (a “Fork Coin”; collectively with Bitcoin, “Bitcoin, Etc.”) (including, but not limited to, any damage related to payments in Bitcoin, Etc. or cash not being received), and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
3. 私/当社は、本書式のダウンロードその他のために必要なコンピュータ等の機器、ソフトウェアその他のアプリケーション、通信回線その他の通信環境等の準備(必要なアプリケーションのインストールを含む。)及び維持、並びに自らの利用環境に応じたコンピュータ・ウイルスの感染の防止、不正アクセス及び情報漏洩の防止等のセキュリティ対策を、自らの費用と責任において行うこと。本項に定める事項の違反に起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。私/当社は、MTGOX及び再生管財人が利用環境を推奨した場合であっても動作保証は行わないことを認識し、これに同意していること。 I/We will, at my/our expense and responsibility, setup and maintain computers and other equipment, software and other applications, telecommunication lines and other telecommunication environments, among others, necessary to download this form (including installing necessary applications) and, in accordance with my/our use environment, take security measures, such as preventing infection by computer viruses, unauthorized access and information divulgence. MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with any breach of any matter stipulated in this paragraph, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee. I/We acknowledge and agree that notwithstanding that MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee have recommended a use environment its operation is not guaranteed in any respect.
4. 私/当社は、自らの責任において、MTGOXのビットコイン取引所に登録していたユーザーネーム、メールアドレス及びパスワード、MTGOXの破産手続(東京地方裁判所平成26年(フ)第3830号。以下「本破産手続」という。)において債権者情報として登録した連絡先メールアドレス等私/当社であることの確認のために必要な情報及びこれに関連するもの(以下、総称して「パスワード等」という。)を管理、保管するものとし、パスワード等を第三者に利用させたり、貸与、譲渡、名義変更、売買その他処分をしたりしないこと。再生管財人は、私/当社のパスワード等により行われた一切の行為を、私/当社の行為とみなすことができ、パスワード等の管理不十分、使用上の過誤、漏洩、第三者の使用、盗用等に起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 I/We will, at my/our responsibility, manage and store user names, email address and passwords registered on the MTGOX Bitcoin exchange; the contact address registered as creditor information in the bankruptcy proceedings (Tokyo District Court; 2014 (fu) Case No. 3830; the “Bankruptcy Proceedings”); or any other information necessary for identity confirmation and anything related thereto (collectively, the “Passwords”) and will neither permit any third party to use the Passwords nor lend, assign, transfer ownership, trade, or handle the Passwords in any other manner. The Rehabilitation Trustee may deem all acts conducted with my/our Passwords as mine/our act; and MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with insufficient management, erroneous use, divulgence, third party use, illegal use, or otherwise of the Passwords, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
5. 私/当社は、再生管財人が定めている又は今後定める、再生管財人が用意した方式・方法による届出・通知及びこれに関連する事項を行う際のルール(今後の変更を含む。)を理解した上でこれに従うものとし、当該ルールに違反し、又は違反しようとしたことに起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 I/We will familiarize myself/ourselves with and follow current rules or future rules (as amended from time to time) for any filing/notifying with the form/method the Rehabilitation Trustee provided and anything related thereto stipulated, by the Rehabilitation Trustee; and MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with any breach of or any attempted breach of the rules, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
6. 他のウェブサイトからMTGOXのウェブサイトへのリンクが提供されている場合においても、MTGOXのウェブサイト以外のウェブサイト及びそこから得られる情報並びにそれに起因又は関連して生じる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any website other than MTGOX’s website, any information obtained therefrom, and any Damages arising out of or in connection with the same, notwithstanding that MTGOX’s website may be linked on another website, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
7. 私/当社と他の再生債権者その他の者との間において生じた取引、連絡、紛争等については、私/当社の責任において処理及び解決するものとし、かかる事項及びそれに起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 I/we will, at my/our responsibility, handle and resolve any and all transactions, communication, disputes, among others, arising between me/us, another rehabilitation creditor, or any other person; and MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any relevant matter and any Damages arising out thereof or in connection therewith, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
8. 法律、政令、法令、命令、通達、条例、ガイドラインその他の規制(以下「法令等」という。)又は消費税を含む税制の将来の制定又は変更に起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社は、MTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。また、法令等又は消費税を含む税制の将来の制定又は変更が過去に遡及した場合に、これに起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with a future enactment or amendment to a law, cabinet order, ordinance, order, directive, bylaw, guideline, or any other regulation (“Laws”) or the tax system, including consumption tax; and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee. Further, MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with any future enactment or amendment with a retroactive effect on Laws or the tax system including consumption tax, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
9. 裁判所又は再生管財人が、再生管財人が私/当社のメールアドレスと認めるメールアドレス宛に電子メールにより通知を送信することによって、私/当社に対する適法な通知があったものとみなすこと。当該メールアドレスの不備等(メールアドレスの記載漏れを含む。)に起因又は関連して、当該メールアドレスに宛てた電子メールを送信することができず又は電子メールが到達しない場合(到達が確認できない場合を含む。)であっても同様とすること。 An appropriate notification is deemed to have been made to me/us if the court or the Rehabilitation Trustee sends a notification via email to the email address which is considered to be my/our email address by the Rehabilitation Trustee. The same applies notwithstanding that, due to, or in connection with, an inadequacy, inaccurateness or incompleteness, or any other issue (including omission of the email address), in or with that email address, an email addressed to that email address cannot be sent or the email is not delivered including where receipt is unconfirmed.
10.私/当社が本届出書を利用して行った再生債権の届出の内容について、再生管財人が裁判所その他必要な第三者に提出すること。 The Rehabilitation Trustee may submit the proof of rehabilitation claim filed by me/us using this form to the court and other third parties as necessary.
11.私/当社は、本民事再生手続においてパスワード等を用いて入手することができる一切の情報(他の再生債権者に関する情報を含むが、これに限られない。)を、本民事再生手続における権利行使の目的にのみ使用することとし、第三者に提供、開示又は漏洩しないこと。 I/We will use information (including, but not limited to, information related to any other rehabilitation creditors) acquired by using the Passwords in the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings only for the purpose of exercising rights in the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings and will not provide, disclose, or divulge such information to any third party.
12.私/当社の本民事再生手続における議決権の額は、再生管財人が提示する次の為替レートによって、円換算されて評価されること。 The amount of my/our voting rights in the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings is computed through conversion to Japanese Yen (JPY) using the following exchange rates provided by the Rehabilitation Trustee:
(a) 外国通貨 平成30年6月21日(日本時間)の東京外国為替市場・電信為替売相場として三菱UFJリサーチ&コンサルティング株式会社が公表した相場 Foreign currency: the exchange rates publicly announced by Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting Co., Ltd. as the Tokyo Foreign Exchange Market / Telegraphic Transfer Selling Rate on June 21, 2018 (Japan Time) (b) ビットコイン 平成30年6月21日23時59分(日本時間)時点のCoinDeskが発表する米国ドル建てのビットコイン相場を(a)の相場により日本円に換算した金額(1 BTC=6,724.57米国ドル=749,318.83円。1米国ドル=111.43円) Bitcoin: the amount obtained by converting the Bitcoin price denominated in USD announced by CoinDesk at 23:59 on June 21, 2018 (Japan Time) to JPY using the exchange rate referred to in the above (a). (1 BTC=6,724.57 USD = 749,318.83 JPY; 1 USD = 111.43 JPY) (c) ビットコインキャッシュ 平成30年6月21日23時59分(日本時間)時点のCoinDeskが発表する米国ドル建てのビットコインキャッシュ相場を(a)の相場により日本円に換算した金額(1 BCH=874.82米国ドル=97,481.19円。1米国ドル=111.43円) Bitcoin Cash: the amount obtained by converting the Bitcoin Cash Price denominated in USD announced by CoinDesk at 23:59 on June 21, 2018 (Japan time) to JPY using the exchange rate referred to in the above (a). (1 BCH = 874.82 USD = 97,481.19 JPY; 1 USD = 111.43 JPY) (d) その他の仮想通貨 金額は未定 Amounts for other cryptocurrencies: not determined
13.本民事再生手続においては、ビットコイン等の返還請求権は非金銭債権として取り扱われ、当該返還請求権に係る遅延損害金は生じないこととすること。 In the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings, the right to claim for return of Bitcoin Etc. is treated as a non-monetary claim, and no delay damages pertaining to such right to claim for return will accrue.
14.再生管財人の私/当社への弁済(金銭及びビットコイン等の弁済を含む。)及びこれに関連する行為が、日本国の外国為替及び外国貿易法、米国財務省の金融制裁(OFAC規制)その他私/当社に関して適用のあるいかなる法令等にも抵触しないこと。再生管財人は、再生管財人の実施する私/当社への弁済及びこれに関連する行為が、日本国外の法令等に抵触しないことをいかなる意味においても保証しないこと。これらの法令等への抵触に起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。再生管財人の私/当社への弁済に起因又は関連して私/当社に課される一切の公租公課(当該弁済の態様によって公租公課の額が増減する場合を含む。)は、私/当社が負担し、当該公租公課又はその増減に起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 Any payment (including payment of cash and Bitcoin Etc.) to me/us by the Rehabilitation Trustee and any act related thereto do not conflict with the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act of Japan, the United States Department of the Treasury’s financial sanctions (OFAC regulations) and any other applicable Laws. The Rehabilitation Trustee does not guarantee, in any respect, that payment to me/us by the Rehabilitation Trustee and any act related thereto do not conflict with Laws outside of Japan. MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with any conflict with any applicable Laws, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee. I/We will bear all taxes and other public charges (including any increases or decreases in the amount of taxes and other public charges due to the manner of the payment) levied on me/us arising out of or in connection with any payment to me/us by the Rehabilitation Trustee; and MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with such taxes and other public charges and increase or decrease thereof, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
15.再生管財人が、仮想通貨取引所(日本国内の仮想通貨交換業者を含むが、これに限られない。以下同じ。)又は金融機関(資金移動業者を含む。以下同じ。)に開設された再生債権者の口座に対して弁済金を振り込む場合、私/当社は、再生管財人の指定する方法により届け出た氏名・名称と同一名義の仮想通貨取引所又は金融機関の口座で受け取ること。 If the Rehabilitation Trustee transfers the money for distribution to an account of a rehabilitation creditor opened at a cryptocurrency exchange (including, but not limited to, cryptocurrency exchangers in Japan; the same applies below) or a financial institution (including fund transfer operators; the same applies below), I/we will receive the same in the account at the cryptocurrency exchange or the financial institution under the same name as that name I/we notified in the manner designated by the Rehabilitation Trustee.
16.私/当社が再生管財人の指定する仮想通貨取引所に開設した口座でビットコイン等及び/又は金銭で弁済を受ける場合には、次の各事項。 If I/we receive payment in Bitcoin Etc. and/or in cash in an account opened at the cryptocurrency exchange designated by the Rehabilitation Trustee, the following applies:
(a) 私/当社は、送付先等の必要情報を正確に提供しなければならず、その誤りから結果的にビットコイン等及び/又は金銭を受領できなかったとしても、それに起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 I/we must accurately provide necessary information about my/our accounts, among others, and, notwithstanding that an error therein results in my/our not receiving Bitcoin, Etc. or cash, MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with such non-receipt, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
(b) 再生管財人がビットコイン等及び/又は金銭を当該仮想通貨取引所に交付した時点で弁済が完了し、MTGOX及び再生管財人の弁済義務は消滅するものとし、再生管財人による当該仮想通貨取引所へのビットコイン等及び/又は金銭の交付後、私/当社が何らかの理由(仮想通貨のブロックチェーンの不具合、仮想通貨取引所のシステムの不具合を含むが、これらに限られない。)により仮想通貨取引所からのビットコイン等及び/又は金銭の適切な弁済を受けることができなかったとしても、それに起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 The instant the Rehabilitation Trustee sends Bitcoin, Etc. or cash to the cryptocurrency exchange, the payment by MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee is deemed complete, and the payment obligation of MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee is deemed to be discharged; and, after Bitcoin Etc. or cash has been sent to the cryptocurrency exchange by the Rehabilitation Trustee, notwithstanding that I/we fail to receive appropriate payment of Bitcoin Etc. or cash from the cryptocurrency exchange for any reason (including, but not limited to, a malfunction in the blockchain of the cryptocurrency or a system malfunction at the cryptocurrency exchange), MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with such failure, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
17.私/当社が金融機関の口座において金銭で弁済を受ける場合には、次の各事項。 If I/we receive cash in an account at a financial institution, the following applies:
(a) 私/当社は、送付先等の必要情報を正確に提供しなければならず、その誤りから結果的に金銭を受領できなかったとしても、それに起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 I/We must accurately provide necessary information about my/our accounts, among others, and, notwithstanding that an error therein results in my/our not receiving cash, MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with that, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
(b) 取扱通貨の種別や送金元銀行との取引の有無、日本国内外の法令等及び各金融機関の内部基準への抵触並びに諸手数料の発生その他要因に基づき弁済金を受領できなかったとしても、それに起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 Notwithstanding that I/we fail to receive cash for distribution due to unavailability of the designated currencies or transactions with the designated financial institutions, any conflict with Laws in or outside Japan or an internal standard of any relevant financial institution, various processing charges and fees, or any other causes, MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with that, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
(c) 諸手数料等を差し引いた金額の弁済金を受け取る場合であっても、当該諸手数料等に起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 Notwithstanding that I/we have received payment from which various processing charges and fees have been deducted, MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with such processing charges and fees, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
18.フォークコインに係る再生債権の届出については、ビットコインに関する再生債権の届出をもって、届け出たビットコインの数に応じて、フォークコインに係る再生債権についても届け出たものとみなし、再生債権者は独自にフォークコインに係る再生債権を届け出ないこと。再生債権の届出があるとみなされるフォークコインは、通常の方法により売却可能であり、かつ、財産的価値のあるものに限られ、それ以外のフォークコインについては、再生債権の届出があるとは認められないこと。なお、ビットコインキャッシュは再生債権の届出があるとみなされるフォークコインに含まれること。 The filing of a proof of rehabilitation claim for a Fork Coin is deemed to have been made in proportion to the number of the filed Bitcoin for which the proof of rehabilitation claim has been filed, and the rehabilitation creditor cannot file its own proof of rehabilitation claim for a Fork Coin. Fork Coins that are deemed to have been filed are limited to those that can be sold in an ordinary manner and that have property value, and no other Fork Coin will be recognized as being deemed to have been filed. Bitcoin Cash is included in Fork Coins that are deemed to have been filed.
19.私/当社が再生管財人により認められた債権を契約により第三者に譲渡する場合には、当該譲渡契約の準拠法は日本法にするものとし、MTGOX及び再生管財人に当該譲渡を対抗するためには、日本法に基づく債権譲渡の対抗要件その他再生管財人が指定する要件を備えることが必要であること。再生管財人は、各国の法令等の定め及び債権譲渡契約で定められた準拠法の定めにかかわらず、日本法のみに基づき債権譲渡契約の有効性及び対抗要件具備の有無を判断すること。再生管財人が日本法に基づき債権譲渡契約の有効性及び対抗要件具備の有無を判断することに起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 If I/we intend to transfer or assign any rehabilitation claim that was approved by the Rehabilitation Trustee to any third party pursuant to an agreement, the governing law for such agreement shall be Japanese law, and the perfection requirements in accordance with the relevant Japanese law and any other requirements specified by the Rehabilitation Trustee shall be fully satisfied to perfect such claim transfer or assignment against MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee. The Rehabilitation Trustee will determine the validity of such claim transfer or assignment and perfection thereof pursuant only to Japanese law, irrespective of any statute in each country’s Laws and any governing law provided for in such agreement. MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with the Rehabilitation Trustee determining the validity of such claim transfer or assignment and perfection thereof pursuant to Japanese law, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
20.再生管財人による債権譲渡の承認が、債権譲渡の承認に必要な手続(譲渡人及び譲受人の本人確認、譲渡を証明する文書の検証を含むが、これらに限られない。)その他の理由により遅滞した場合であっても、これに起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私/当社はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 Notwithstanding that approval by the Rehabilitation Trustee of a claim transfer or assignment is delayed by the procedures necessary for approval of a claim transfer or assignment (including, but not limited to, identity check of the transferoassignor and transferee/assignee and verification of documents proving transfer or assignment) or any other reason, MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with such delay, and I/we will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
21.ある再生債権を譲渡する場合、当該再生債権の全部を譲渡することとし、その一部のみを譲渡しないこと。 If a rehabilitation claim is transferred or assigned, all of such rehabilitation claim, not part thereof, shall be transferred or assigned.
22.ビットコイン等に係る再生債権を譲渡する場合には、対象となるビットコイン及び当該ビットコインから分岐したフォークコインを併せて譲渡するものとし、ビットコイン又はフォークコインに係る再生債権を個別に譲渡しないこと。 If a rehabilitation claim pertaining to Bitcoin, Etc. is transferred or assigned, the Bitcoin subject to such transfer or assignment and the Fork Coin split from such Bitcoin shall be transferred or assigned collectively, and a rehabilitation claim pertaining to Bitcoin or Fork Coin shall not be transferred or assigned individually.
23.情報の取扱いに関する同意事項 Matters of consent related to information management
(a) 再生管財人が、以下の情報(個人情報の保護に関する法律(平成15年法律第57号)第2条第1項により定義される個人情報その他識別された又は識別可能な自然人に関する一切の情報を含むが、これに限られない。以下同じ。)を収集すること。 The Rehabilitation Trustee may collect the information below (including, but not limited to, personal information defined under Article 2(1) of the Act on the Protection of Personal Information (Act No. 57 of 2003) and any other information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person; the same applies below)
i. 私/当社が再生管財人に提供する情報 information that I/we provided to the Rehabilitation Trustee;
ii. 私/当社以外の情報源(身元証明サービス機関を含むが、これに限られない。)から収集する私/当社の情報 information concerning me/us provided by an information source (including, but not limited to, organizations providing ID verification services) other than myself/ourselves;
iii. 本破産手続において、私/当社が本破産手続の破産管財人に提供した一切の情報 all information that I/we provided to the bankruptcy trustee of the Bankruptcy Proceedings;
iv. 私/当社が、MTGOXに提供した一切の情報 all information that I/we provided to MTGOX; and
v. その他再生管財人が適正な方法により取得し、又は今後取得する情報 any other information acquired, or to be acquired going forward, by the Rehabilitation Trustee using an appropriate method
(b) 再生管財人が、収集した上記(a)の情報を、以下の目的で日本国内外で管理及び利用すること。 The Rehabilitation Trustee may manage and use collected information stated in (a) above for the purposes below in and outside of Japan.
i. 再生債権の届出、調査、再生計画の立案、再生計画に基づく弁済その他の本民事再生手続の適切な遂行 filing proofs of rehabilitation claim, investigations of rehabilitation claims, drafting a rehabilitation plan, distribution in accordance with a rehabilitation plan, or any other appropriate execution of the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings;
ii. 公益的な目的のためにする、日本国内外の行政官庁・捜査機関・司法機関への上記(a)の情報の開示又は提供 disclosing or providing information stated in (a) above to any government office, any investigation agency, or any judicial agency in or outside of Japan for the purpose of serving public interests; and
iii. その他上記目的に付随する目的 any other purposes incidental to the above purposes.
(c) 再生管財人が、上記(b)の目的のため、上記(a)の情報を、第三者(以下の者を含むが、これらに限られない。)に開示又は提供する場合があること。これらの第三者には、①米国、②カナダ、③イギリス、④私/当社が所在する国及び⑤私/当社が再生債権の弁済の受領のために利用する金融機関又は仮想通貨取引所が所在する国に、それぞれ所在する第三者が含まれること。 The Rehabilitation Trustee may disclose or provide information stated in (a) above for the purpose of (b) above to any third party (including, but not limited to, the persons below). The third parties hereunder include third parties located in (i) the United States of America, (ii) Canada, (iii) the United Kingdom, (iv) the country in which I am/we are located, and (v) the country in which the financial institution or cryptocurrency exchange that I/we use to receive payment for the rehabilitation claim is located.
東京地方裁判所その他裁判所(日本国外の裁判所を含む。)、本民事再生手続及び本破産手続(併せて以下「本民事再生手続等」という。)における調査委員(その代理及び補佐を含む。)その他の機関、日本国内外の行政官庁・捜査機関、管財人が本民事再生手続等の遂行のために依頼する法律事務所及びデロイトトーマツコンサルティング合同会社等の専門家、金融機関、仮想通貨取引所、他の再生債権者、Eメールサービスプロバイダー、及び詐欺行為検証サービスプロバイダー Tokyo District Court and other courts (including courts outside of Japan); the Examiner (chosa iin) (including deputy examiners and assistant examiners) and other officers or bodies in the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings or the Bankruptcy Proceedings (collectively, the “Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings, Etc.”); government offices and investigation agencies in or outside of Japan; counsel and experts including the law firms and Deloitte Tohmatsu Consulting LLC. which the trustee has retained to proceed with the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings, Etc.; financial institutions; cryptocurrency exchangers; other rehabilitation creditors; email service providers; and fraudulent act verification service providers
(d) 管財人は、本民事再生手続等に必要な限りで私/当社のブラウザ設定により影響されない特定の永続クッキーを使用する可能性があること。 The trustee might, to the extent necessary for the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings, Etc., use a specific permanent cookies setting that will be unaffected by my/our browser setting.
24.私/当社の再生債権に関する事項が、オンライン上で他の再生債権者による閲覧の対象となり、また、東京地方裁判所において本民事再生手続の利害関係人の閲覧及び謄写の対象となる場合があること。 The information regarding my/our rehabilitation claim may be available online to other rehabilitation creditors, and may be subject to the inspection and copying thereof at the Tokyo District Court by an interested party in the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings.
25.私が死亡した場合、本民事再生手続との関係では、再生管財人が、日本の法令等及び実務に従って、相続に関する各種関係資料の提出を求め、また、誰を再生債権者として取り扱うかについて判断すること、及び、当該判断に起因又は関連して生じるあらゆる損害等について、MTGOX及び再生管財人は一切の責任を負わず、私及び私の相続人はMTGOX及び再生管財人に対して当該損害等に関して損害賠償請求、補償請求その他一切の請求をしないこと。 For the purpose of the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings, in the event that I died, the Rehabilitation Trustee may, in accordance with the Laws and practices of Japan, request for relevant evidence and explanation on the inheritance and determine who to be treated as the rehabilitation creditor; and MTGOX and the Rehabilitation Trustee are not liable in any respect for any Damages arising out of or in connection with such determination, and I and my heir(s)/successor(s) will not make any claim for damages or compensation, or make any other claim with respect to such Damages against MTGOX or the Rehabilitation Trustee.
26.本同意事項は日本語を正文とすること。本同意事項につき作成される英語の翻訳文は参考にすぎず、日本語と英語との間で相互に内容の相違、矛盾がある場合であっても、日本語のみが効力を有すること。 The governing language of these terms of consent shall be the Japanese language. The English-language translation thereof is merely for reference purposes only; and notwithstanding any discrepancy or contradiction in details between the Japanese-language original and the English-language translation the Japanese-language original shall prevail.
27. 本民事再生手続等及びこれに関連又は付随して生じる一切の請求又は紛争は日本法に準拠し、東京地方裁判所を専属的合意管轄裁判所とすること。 The Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings, Etc. and all claims and disputes arising out of, in connection with, or incidental to, the Civil Rehabilitation Proceedings, Etc. are governed by Japanese law, and the Tokyo District Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction.
28. 再生管財人が、本同意事項を必要に応じ変更すること。但し、再生管財人が変更についてwww.mtgox.comにおいて告知したものに限る。 The Rehabilitation Trustee will, as necessary, amend these terms of consent. However, amendments are limited to those that the Rehabilitation Trustee has notified on the website www.mtgox.com.
submitted by OculoDoc to mtgoxinsolvency [link] [comments]

My review of "A model for Bitcoin’s security and the declining block subsidy" -- a new research paper by Hasu, Prestwich & Curtis

In their new paper, authors Hasu, James Prestwich and Brandon Curtis present a simple yet realistic model for bitcoin's security as the block subsidy declines:
https://uncommoncore.co/research-paper-a-model-for-bitcoins-security-and-the-declining-block-subsidy/
With a block subsidy halving scheduled for next spring, the topic is timely. As the authors' note
"the most important source of miner revenue, the block subsidy, will have to be replaced by an entirely new source of revenue"
Indeed, and it is miner revenue that plays the critical role in bitcoin's security.
Work on this topic tends to come in two flavors. Flavor 1 is full of mathematical splendor built upon assumptions that are too simplistic to make realistic predictions (e.g., assuming an arbitrary amount of hash power can be easily rented and thus predicting that double-spends should be occurring all the time [yet they rarely do]). Flavor 2 is better grounded in empirical fact but often limited to qualitative reasoning alone. This paper has the best features of both: it succeeds in incorporating the most-important real-world factors but in a way that still results in a rigorous model that permits quantitative reasoning about the system's security properties.
Key to the model is the concept of miner-extractable value (MEV). This is the total value that a miner can extract by "not mining honestly" as it were (e.g., reorging the chain or other shenanigans permitted by the protocol). If the MEV is big enough, then a miner can earn more profit by attacking than by mining honestly.
The paper is unique by incorporating the term p(postAttackPrice) in the model. If p(postAttackPrice) = 95%, it means the price of a bitcoin fell to 95% of its pre-attack price as a direct result of the attack. Interestingly, in the authors' model, only MEV and the miners' revenue are discounted by this term. The miners' cost remains fixed, as these costs are tied to consuming real-world resources like electricity and transistors. This means the expected value of the attack becomes negative very quickly with even small changes in postAttackPrice.
(Aside: Does this highlight an important difference between proof-of-work (PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS)? In a proof-of-stake system, the costs are denominated in the same "units" as the rewards, since there is no tether to the physical world via mining. And so the terms in the equations related to the miners' costs might scale with p(postAttackPrice) too, thereby weakening the security model compared to PoW.)
The authors' then describe how, based on their research, ~50% of the cost of mining is due to fixed infrastructure costs (a term in their model called "commitment") rather marginal costs. Since a decrease in postAttackPrice applies over the entire lifetime of this infrastructure, even a slight decrease can impose a big cost on the miner, making dishonest mining unprofitable if detected.
(Aside: although the authors consider the security of confirmed transactions in their model, the arguments related to the infrastructure commitment and postAttackPrice apply similarly to miner-assisted fraud for unconfirmed transactions. Proposals such as subchains, STORM and double-spend proofs that bring visibility to miner shenanigans thus increase unconfirmed transaction security by providing the market with the information it needs to react (e.g., to drive down postAttackPrice)).
Finally, the authors include a term in their model that reflects the fact that the users could temporarily suspend Nakamoto consensus and fork to a different chain where the miners' infrastructure commitment has no value. This isn't new (it's often called the "nuclear option") but it's also incorporated into their quantitative model.
In terms of solutions moving forward, the authors talk about constraining the amount of block space produced to derive maximal transaction fee revenue from the users. This is a topic explored in depth by Nicola Dimitri in a recent peer-reviewed paper from the spring of 2019 that the authors may not be aware of:
https://ledgerjournal.org/ojs/index.php/ledgearticle/view/145/153
The authors also discuss the controversial option of ceasing the reward halvings in the future in order to maintain sufficient miner revenue for security. I agree this is a discussion we need to have. The point driven home by the authors is that, whether through transaction fees or inflation, security must be paid for somehow. And it's not yet clear what methods provide the best value for the network as a whole.
I do find it odd -- and a testament to how religious the cryptocurrency space is -- that the authors were brave enough to discuss increasing bitcoin's inflation head on, yet only skirted around the taboo topic of increasing the block size limit. It is very easy to see that by scaling bitcoin on-chain, for example to 50,000 tx/sec each paying $0.02 in transaction fees, would result in $1000 per second of miner revenue even without any subsidy -- 5 times more than the ~$200 per second the miners earn today. If bitcoin (BTC) discourse is actually at the point where an increase in the inflation schedule is on the table while an increase in the block size limit remains off the table, then BTC is doomed. Ironically, the authors discuss that one way to erode confidence in the system is by limiting transaction throughput:
"one way to achieve this [erode user trust in the system] would be to establish a mining monopoly and stop processing any transaction at all"
which, depending on the lens through which one is looking, is nearly the situation BTC finds itself in today.
Overall I think this was a really well written paper that both bitcoin newbies and veterans will enjoy.
submitted by Peter__R to btc [link] [comments]

IOTA Definition

IOTA Definition
History of IOTA
The blockchain was announced in October 2015 through. The roots of IOTA go back to the Jinn project. That project aimed to develop ternary hardware or low-cost and energy-efficient hardware, primarily general-purpose processors, for use in the IoT ecosystem. Jinn held a crowd sale for its tokens in September 2014. The Jinn tokens were soon in hot water because they marketed as profit-sharing tokens.. In 2015, Jinn was rebranded as IOTA, and another token sale was held. This time around, the tokens were marketed as utility tokens, and Jinn token holders could exchange their tokens at equivalency with the new blockchain. According to David Sønstebø, IOTA was “spawned” due to the Jinn project. But reports state that a snapshot of the genesis transaction is yet to be found online. These tokens were dispersed to other “founder” addresses. The total number of mIOTAs planned to be in existence is 27 quadrillion. According to IOTA’s founders, the total number of mIOTAs fits in “nicely” with the maximum allowable integer value in Javascript, a programming language.
Understanding IOTA
According to research firm Gartner, there will be 20.4 billion devices connected to the Internet by 2020. Within this ecosystem, each device will exchange data and payment information with multiple, other devices in transactions conducted throughout the day. IOTA intends to become the standard mode of conducting transactions on devices. Its founders have described the ledger as a “public permission-less backbone for the Internet of Things that enables interoperability between multiple devices.” In simple words, this means that it will enable transactions between connected devices, and anyone will be able to access it. Those problems are primarily caused due to a backlog of transactions on Bitcoin’s blockchain. The backlog itself is because of a variety of reasons, from small block sizes to the difficulty of puzzles that miners must solve to earn the cryptocurrency as a reward. IOTA solves these problems by reconfiguring blockchain's architecture into Tangle, a new way of organizing data and confirming transactions.
How Does IOTA Solve Bitcoin’s Scalability Problems?
IOTA’s solution to Bitcoin’s problems is to do away with several key concepts and topographical constraints of a blockchain. mIOTA, IOTA’s cryptocurrency, is pre-mined and consensus of transactions occurs differently as compared to a blockchain. IOTA developers have proposed a new data structure. Tangle is a Decentralized Acyclic Graph, a system of nodes which is not sequential. Thus, each node can be connected to multiple other nodes in a Tangle. But they are connected only in a particular direction, meaning that a node cannot refer back to itself. A standard blockchain is also a DAG because it is a sequential linked set. In Bitcoin, a group of systems running full nodes that contain the entire history of transactions for a ledger are required for confirmations and consensus. Full node miners are not required in Tangle. Each new transaction is confirmed by referencing two previous transactions, reducing the amount of time and memory required to confirm a transaction. Related to the concept of a “confidence” is a transaction’s weight. As it moves through Tangle, a transaction gathers weight. A transaction’s weight increases with the number of approvals. Once a transaction is confirmed, it is broadcast to the entire network, and another unconfirmed transaction can choose the newly-confirmed transaction as one of the tips to confirm itself.
Governance Protocol
IOTA has not outlined a governance structure for its blockchain. The IOTA Foundation is primarily responsible for funding and leading development of IOTA. In a previous post, John Licciardello, former managing director of IOTA's Ecosystem Development Fund (EDF), that would allow members of the IOTA community to vote on proposals regarding its future direction. But there are no updates on the initiative yet.
Concerns About IOTA
Criticism of IOTA has mainly centered around its technical flaws. As with most cryptocurrencies, IOTA’s system is nascent and unproven. A phishing attack on its network resulted in the theft of mIOTA worth $3.94 million. In other words, they created their encryption scheme from scratch, forgoing the widely-used SHA-256 hash function used in Bitcoin. The team at MIT’s Digital Currency Initiative found serious vulnerabilities with IOTA’s hash function, which is called Curl. This property is known as Collision and denotes a broken hash function. In their analysis of the vulnerability, the MIT team stated that a bad actor could have destroyed or stolen user funds from Tangle with their technique. IOTA’s team has corrected the vulnerability. The foundation announced a new partnership with Ledger, one of the leading producers of hardware wallets. IOTA technology will be integrated into the hardware wallets, giving users the ability to store the private key information in a device that adds another layer of protection from hackers.
https://preview.redd.it/ex768bb74gw31.jpg?width=777&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=4e89f0875410274a85b76227c17d321b5c3d29ed
“The collaboration between the teams created an immediate synergy concentrated on developing a compatibility feature allowing users to access, store and manage IOTA tokens on Ledger devices. 

The IOTA (MIOTA) digital asset suffered from a lack of adequate wallets for months, even at the peak of the market. The asset, which commanded prices above $5, was not spared by the bear market. Despite the launch of the long-awaited Trinity wallet, MIOTA lost positions. Given that mIOTA, the crypto used in IOTA, is still to gain mainstream traction, its claims to eliminate scalability problems for blockchains through the use of DAGs are also still to be proven. Vitalik Buterin, the co-founder of Ethereum, has cast doubt on the ability of hashgraphs to solve scalability issues.
Another problem with IOTA currently is the small size of its network. Researchers have found that hackers need only gain control of 33% of the total hashing power required to bring it down. In Bitcoin, control of 51% of a network is required to bring its blockchain down. To ensure security, IOTA’s network currently uses a central server known as a Coordinator to process transactions. This practice has diluted its claims of being a decentralized system since the introduction of a Coordinator has resulted in the introduction of a single point of failure.
The consensus system is described in a new white paper. In the past, IOTA has been criticized for its hidden centralization, as well as for the loss of coins sometimes happening when a user’s wallet was unable to receive its previous balances from the state of the Tangle.
But despite the innovation, IOTA lags behind digital assets that are receiving the most significant inflows of investment and trading liquidity.
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